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ABSTRACT
Double-fetch bugs are a special type of race condition, where an
unprivileged execution thread is able to change a memory location
between the time-of-check and time-of-use of a privileged execution
thread. If an unprivileged attacker changes the value at the right
time, the privileged operation becomes inconsistent, leading to a
change in control flow, and thus an escalation of privileges for the
attacker. More severely, such double-fetch bugs can be introduced
by the compiler, entirely invisible on the source-code level.
We propose novel techniques to efficiently detect, exploit, and
eliminate double-fetch bugs. We demonstrate the first combination
of state-of-the-art cache attacks with kernel-fuzzing techniques to
allow fully automated identification of double fetches. We demon-
strate the first fully automated reliable detection and exploitation
of double-fetch bugs, making manual analysis as in previous work
superfluous. We show that cache-based triggers outperform state-
of-the-art exploitation techniques significantly, leading to an ex-
ploitation success rate of up to 97 %. Our modified fuzzer automati-
cally detects double fetches and automatically narrows down this
candidate set for double-fetch bugs to the exploitable ones. We
present the first generic technique based on hardware transactional
memory, to eliminate double-fetch bugs in a fully automated and
transparent manner. We extend defensive programming techniques
by retrofitting arbitrary code with automated double-fetch preven-
tion, both in trusted execution environments as well as in syscalls,
with a performance overhead below 1%.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Operating systems security;
1 INTRODUCTION
The security of modern computer systems relies fundamentally on
the security of the operating system kernel, providing strong isola-
tion between processes. While kernels are increasingly hardened
against various types of memory corruption attacks, race condi-
tions are still a non-trivial problem. Syscalls are a common scenario
in which the trusted kernel space has to interact with the untrusted
user space, requiring sharing of memory locations between the two
environments. Among possible bugs in this scenario are time-of-
check-to-time-of-use bugs, where the kernel accesses a memory
location twice, first to check the validity of the data and second
to use it (double fetch) [65]. If such double fetches are exploitable,
they are considered double-fetch bugs. The untrusted user space
application can change the value between the two accesses and
thus corrupt kernel memory and consequently escalate privileges.
Double-fetch bugs can not only be introduced at the source-code
level but also by compilers, entirely invisible for the programmer
and any source-code-level analysis technique [5]. Recent research
has found a significant amount of double fetches in the kernel
through static analysis [70], and memory access tracing through
full CPU emulation [39]. Both works had to manually determine
for every double fetch, whether it is a double-fetch bug.
Double fetches have the property that the data is fetched twice
from memory. If the data is already in the cache (cache hit), the
data is fetched from the cache, if the data is not in the cache (cache
miss), it is fetched from main memory into the cache. Differences
between fetches from cache and memory are the basis for so-called
cache attacks, such as Flush+Reload [57, 76], which obtain secret
information by observing memory accesses [22]. Instead of exploit-
ing the cache side channel for obtaining secret information, we
utilize it to detect double fetches.
In this paper, we showhow to efficiently and automatically detect,
exploit, and eliminate double-fetch bugs, with two new approaches:
DECAF and DropIt.
DECAF is a double-fetch-exposing cache-guided augmentation
for fuzzers, which automatically detects and exploits real-world
double-fetch bugs in a two-phase process. In the profiling phase,
DECAF relies on cache side channel information to detect whenever
the kernel accesses a syscall parameter. Using this novel technique,
DECAF is able to detect whether a parameter is fetched multiple
times, generating a candidate set containing double fetches, i.e.,
some of which are potential double-fetch bugs. In the exploita-
tion phase, DECAF uses a cache-based trigger signal to flip val-
ues while fuzzing syscalls from the candidate set, to trigger actual
double-fetch bugs. In contrast to previous purely probability-based
approaches, cache-based trigger signals enable deterministic double-
fetch-bug exploitation. Our automated exploitation exceeds state-
of-the-art techniques, where checking the double-fetch candidate
set for actual double-fetch bugs is tedious manual work. We show
that DECAF can also be applied to trusted execution environments,
e.g., ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX.
DropIt is a protection mechanism to eliminate double-fetch bugs.
DropIt uses hardware transactional memory to efficiently drop
the current execution state in case of a concurrent modification.
Hence, double-fetch bugs are automatically reduced to ordinary
non-exploitable double fetches. In case user-controlled memory
locations are modified, DropIt continues the execution from the
last consistent state. Applying DropIt to syscalls induces no per-
formance overhead on arbitrary computations running in other
threads and only a negligible performance overhead of 0.8 % on
the process executing the protected syscall. We show that DropIt
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can also be applied to trusted execution environments, e.g., ARM
TrustZone and Intel SGX.
Contributions.We make the following contributions:
(1) We are the first to combine state-of-the-art cache at-
tacks with kernel-fuzzing techniques to build DECAF, a
generic double-fetch-exposing cache-guided augmentation
for fuzzers.
(2) Using DECAF, we are the first to show fully automated reli-
able detection and exploitation of double-fetch bugs, making
manual analysis as in previous work superfluous.
(3) We outperform state-of-the-art exploitation techniques sig-
nificantly, with an exploitation success rate of up to 97 %.
(4) We present DropIt, the first generic technique to eliminate
double-fetch bugs in a fully automated manner, facilitat-
ing newfound effects of hardware transactional memory
on double-fetch bugs. DropIt has a negligible performance
overhead of 0.8 % on protected syscalls.
(5) We show that DECAF can also fuzz trusted execution envi-
ronments in a fully automated manner. We observe strong
synergies between Intel SGX and DropIt, enabling efficient
preventative protection from double-fetch bugs.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide background on cache attacks, race conditions,
and kernel fuzzing. In Section 3, we discuss the building blocks for
finding and eliminating double-fetch bugs. We present the profiling
phase of DECAF in Section 4 and the exploitation phase of DECAF
in Section 5. In Section 6, we show how hardware transactional
memory can be used to eliminate all double-fetch bugs generically.
In Section 7 we discuss the results of we obtained by instantiating
DECAF. We conclude in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Fuzzing
Fuzzing describes the process of testing applications with random-
ized input to find vulnerabilities. Due to the cost-effectiveness and
good results, Duran and Ntafos [14] described fuzzing as a viable
strategy when testing applications.
The term “fuzzing” was coined 1988 by Miller [51] who tested
the effects of noise over “fuzzy” network connections on UNIX ap-
plications. This work was extended to an automated approach for
testing the reliability of several user-space programs on Linux [52],
Windows [19] and Mac OS [50]. There is an immense number of
works exploring user space fuzzing with different forms of feed-
back [12, 15, 20, 23–26, 33, 40, 61, 67]. However, these are not ap-
plicable to this work, as we focus on fuzzing the kernel and trusted
execution environments.
Fuzzing is not limited to testing user-space applications, but it is
also, to amuch smaller extent, used to test the reliability of operating
systems. Regular user space fuzzers cannot be used here, but a
smaller number of tools have been developed to apply fuzzy testing
to operating system interfaces. Carrette [9] developed the tool
CrashMe that tests the robustness of operating systems by trying
to execute random data streams as instructions. Mendoncca et al.
[49] and Jodeit et al. [37] demonstrate that fuzzing drivers via the
hardware level is another possibility to attack an operating system.
Other operating system interfaces that can be fuzzed include the
file system [7] and the virtual machine interface [21, 47].
The syscall interface is a trust boundary between the trusted
kernel, running with the highest privileges, and the unprivileged
user space. Bugs in this interface can be exploited to escalate priv-
ileges. Koopman et al. [41] were among the first to test random
inputs to syscalls. Modern syscall fuzzers, such as Trinity [38] or
syzkaller [69], test most syscalls with semi-intelligent arguments
instead of totally random inputs. In contrast to these generic tools,
Weaver et al. [71] developed perf_fuzzer, which uses domain knowl-
edge to fuzz only the performance monitoring syscalls.
2.2 Flush+Reload
Flush+Reload is a side-channel attack exploiting the difference in
access times between CPU caches and main memory. Yarom and
Falkner [76] presented Flush+Reload as an improvement over the
cache attack by Gullasch et al. [32]. Flush+Reload relies on shared
memory between the attacker and the victim and works as follows:
(1) Establish a shared memory region with the victim (e.g., by
mapping the victim binary into the address space).
(2) Flush one line of the shared memory from the cache.
(3) Schedule the victim process.
(4) Measure the access time to the flushed cache line.
If the victim accesses the cache linewhile being scheduled, it is again
cached. When measuring the access time, the attacker can distin-
guish whether the data is cached or not and thus infer whether the
victim accessed it. As Flush+Reload works on cache line granularity
(usually 64 B), fine-grained attacks are possible. The probability of
false positives is very low with Flush+Reload, as cache hits cannot
be caused by different programs and prefetching can be avoided.
Gruss et al. [29] reported extraordinarily high accuracies, above
99 %, for the Flush+Reload side channel, making it a viable choice
for a wide range of applications.
2.3 Double Fetches and Double-Fetch Bugs
In a scenario where shared memory is accessed multiple times, the
CPU may fetch it multiple times into a register. This is commonly
known as a double fetch. Double fetches occur when the kernel
accesses data provided by the user multiple times, which is often
unavoidable. If proper checks are done, ensuring that a change in
the data during the fetches is correctly handled, double fetches are
non-exploitable valid constructs.
A double-fetch bug is a time-of-check-to-time-of-use race con-
dition, which is exploitable by changing the data in the shared
memory between two accesses. Double-fetch bugs are a subset of
double fetches. A double fetch is a double-fetch bug, if and only
if it can be exploited by concurrent modification of the data. For
example, if a syscall expects a string and first checks the length of
the string before copying it to the kernel, an attacker could change
the string to a longer string after the check, causing a buffer over-
flow in the kernel (Figure 1). In the worst case, this leads to code
execution within the kernel.
Wang et al. [70] used Coccinelle, a transformation and matching
engine for C code, to find double fetches. With this static pattern-
based approach, they identified 90 double fetches inside the Linux
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Thread 0
path = "/tmp/file\0<pointer>";
syscall
compute strlen(path)
allocate buffer
strcopy → buffer overflow
Thread 1
wait
wait
wait
path[9]=’/’
wait
Figure 1: A double-fetch bug exploited from a second thread
by replacing the 0-byte after the length check.
kernel. However, their work incurred several days of manual analy-
sis of these 90 double fetches, identifying only 3 exploitable double-
fetch bugs. A further limitation of their work is that double-fetch
bugs which do not match the implemented patterns, cannot be
detected.
Not all double fetches, and thus not all double-fetch bugs, can
be found using static code analysis. Blanchou [5] demonstrated
that especially in lock-free code, compilers can introduce double
fetches that are not present in the code. Even worse, these compiler-
introduced double fetches can become double-fetch bugs in certain
scenarios (e.g., CVE-2015-8550). Jurczyk et al. [39] presented a dy-
namic approach for finding double fetches. They used a full CPU
emulator to run Windows and log all memory accesses. Note that
this requires significant computation and storage resources, as just
booting Windows already consumes 15 hours of time, resulting in
a log file of more than 100GB [39]. In the memory access log, they
searched for a distinctive double-fetch pattern, e.g., two reads of
the same user-space address within a short time frame. They iden-
tified 89 double fetches in Windows 7 and Windows 8. However,
their work also required manual analysis, in which they found that
only 2 out of around 100 unique double fetches were exploitable
double-fetch bugs. Again, if a double-fetch bug does not match
the implemented double-fetch pattern, it is not detected. In sum-
mary, we find that all techniques for double-fetch bug detection are
probabilistic and hence incomplete.
2.3.1 Race Condition Detection. Besides research on double
fetches and double-fetch bugs, there has been a significant amount
of research on race condition detection in general. Static analysis of
source code and dynamic runtime analysis have been used to find
data race conditions in multithreaded applications. Savage et al.
[62] described the Lockset algorithm. Their tool, Eraser, dynami-
cally detects race conditions in multithreaded programs. Poznian-
sky et al. [59, 60] extended their work to detect race conditions in
multithreaded C++ programs on-the-fly. Yu et al. [78] described
RaceTrack, an adaptive detection algorithm that reports suspicious
activity patterns. These algorithms have been improved and made
more efficient by using more lightweight data structures [18] or
combining various approaches [74].
While these tools can be applied to user space programs, they
are not designed to detect race conditions in the kernel space. Er-
ickson et al. [16] utilized breakpoints and watchpoints on memory
accesses to detect data races in the Windows kernel. With Race-
Hound [55], the same idea has been implemented for the Linux
kernel. The SLAM [3] project uses symbolic model checking, pro-
gram analysis, and theorem proving, to verify whether a driver
correctly interacts with the operating system. Schwarz et al. [63]
Thread 1Thread 0 Cache
mov
mov
mov
xbegin
mov
mov
mov
xend
else path
of xbegin
data
read read
dataread
data
write
read write
transactional a
bort read set
Figure 2: Memory locations are automatically added to read
and write set. Upon conflicting memory accesses a transac-
tional abort unrolls all transactional operations and jumps
to the else path of xbegin.
utilized software model checking to detect security violations in a
Linux distribution.
More closely related to double-fetch bugs, other time-of-check-
to-time-of-use bugs exist. By changing the content of a memory
location that is passed to the operating system, the content of a file
could be altered after a validity check [4, 8, 72]. Especially time-of-
check-to-time-of-use bugs in the file system are well-studied, and
several solutions have been proposed [13, 43, 58, 68].
2.4 Hardware Transactional Memory
Hardware transactional memory is designed for optimizing syn-
chronization primitives [17, 77]. Any changes performed inside a
transaction are not visible to the outside before the transaction suc-
ceeds. The processor speculatively lets a thread perform a sequence
of operations inside a transaction. Unless there is a conflict due to
a concurrent modification of a data value, the transaction succeeds.
However, if a conflict occurs before the transaction is completed
(e.g., a concurrent write access), the transaction aborts. In this case,
all changes that have been performed in the transaction are dis-
carded, and the previous state is recovered. These fundamental
properties of hardware transactional memory imply that once a
value is read in a transaction, the value cannot be changed from
outside the transaction anymore for the time of the transaction.
Intel TSX implements hardware transactional memory on a cache
line granularity. It maintains a read set which is limited to the size
of the L3 cache and a write set which is limited to the size of the
L1 cache [27, 36, 46, 79]. A cache line is automatically added to the
read set when it is read inside a transaction, and it is automatically
added to the write set when it is modified inside a transaction.
Modifications to any memory in the read set or write set from other
threads cause the transaction to abort, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Previous work has investigated whether hardware transactional
memory can be instrumented for security features. Guan et al. [31]
proposed to protect cryptographic keys by only decrypting them
within TSX transactions. As the keys are never written to DRAM
in an unencrypted form, they cannot be read from memory even
by a physical attacker probing the DRAM bus. Kuvaiskii et al. [42]
proposed to use TSX to detect hardware faults and roll-back the
system state in case a fault occurred. Shih et al. [66] proposed to
exploit the fact that TSX transactions abort if a page fault occurred
for a memory access to prevent controlled-channel attacks [75] in
cloud scenarios. Chen et al. [10] implemented a counting thread pro-
tected by TSX to detect controlled-channel attacks in SGX enclaves.
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Gruss et al. [30] demonstrated that TSX can be used to protect
against cache side-channel attacks in the cloud.
Shih et al. [66] and Gruss et al. [30] observed that Intel TSX has
several practical limitations. One observation is that executed code
is not considered transactional memory, i.e., virtually unlimited
amount of code can be executed in a transaction. To evade the
limitations caused by the L1 and L3 cache sizes, Shih et al. [66] and
Gruss et al. [30] split transactions that might be memory-intense
into multiple smaller transactions.
3 BUILDING BLOCKS TO DETECT, EXPLOIT,
AND ELIMINATE DOUBLE-FETCH BUGS
In this section, we present building blocks for detecting double
fetches, exploiting double-fetch bugs, and eliminating double-fetch
bugs. These building blocks are the base for DECAF and DropIt.
We identified three primitives, illustrated in Figure 3, for which
we propose novel techniques in this paper:
𝒫1: Detecting double fetches by using the Flush+Reload side
channel.
𝒫2: Distinguishing (exploitable) double-fetch bugs from (non-
exploitable) double fetches by validating their exploitability
by automatically exploiting double-fetch bugs.
𝒫3: Eliminating (exploitable) double-fetch bugs by using hard-
ware transactional memory.
In Section 4, we propose a novel, fully automated technique to
detect double fetches (𝒫1) using a multi-threaded Flush+Reload
cache side-channel attack. Our technique complements other work
on double-fetch bug detection [39, 70] as it covers scenarios which
lead to false positives and false negatives in other detection meth-
ods. Although relying on a side channel may seem unusual, this
approach has certain advantages over state-of-the-art techniques,
such as memory access tracing [39] or static code analysis [70]. We
do not need any model of what constitutes a double fetch in terms
of memory access traces or static code patterns. Hence, we can
detect any double fetch regardless of any double fetch model.
Wang et al. [70] identified as limitations of their initial approach
that false positives occur if a pointer is changed between two fetches
and memory accesses, in fact, go to different locations or if user-
space fetches occur in loops. Furthermore, false negatives occur
if multiple pointers point to the same memory location (pointer
aliasing) or if memory is addressed through different types (type
conversion), or if an element is fetched separately from the cor-
responding pointer and memory. With a refined approach, they
reduced the false positive rate from more than 98% to only 94%,
i.e., 6 % of the detected situations turned out to be actual double-
fetch bugs in the manual analysis. Wang et al. [70] reported that it
took an expert “only a few days” to analyze them. In contrast, our
Flush+Reload-based approach is oblivious to language-level struc-
tures. The Flush+Reload-trigger only depends on actual accesses to
the same memory location, irrespective of any programming con-
structs. Hence, we inherently bypass the problems of the approach
of Wang et al. [70] by design.
Our technique does not replace existing tools, which are either
slow [39] or limited by static code analysis [70] and require manual
analysis. Instead, we complement previous approaches by utilizing
DECAF
(Syscall) Fuzzer Exploit double fetch (𝒫2)
Report
general bug
Detect double fetches (𝒫1)
Double fetch
candidates
Report double-
fetch bug
Fix double-fetch bug
(𝒫3), e.g., DropIt
Figure 3: An overview of the framework. Detecting (Primi-
tive 𝒫1) and exploiting (Primitive 𝒫2) double fetches runs
in parallel to the syscall fuzzer. Reported double-fetch bugs
can be eliminated (Primitive𝒫3) after the fuzzing process.
a side channel, allowing fully automatic detection of double-fetch
bugs, including those that previous approaches may miss.
In Section 5, we propose a novel technique to automatically
determine whether a double fetch found using𝒫1 is an (exploitable)
double-fetch bug (𝒫2). State-of-the-art techniques are only capable
of automatically detecting double fetches using either dynamic [39]
or static [70] code analysis, but cannot determine whether a found
double fetch is an exploitable double-fetch bug. The double fetches
found using these techniques still require manual analysis to check
whether they are valid constructs or exploitable double-fetch bugs.
We close this gap by automatically testing whether double fetches
are exploitable double-fetch bugs (𝒫2), eliminating the need for
manual analysis. Again, this technique relies on a cache side channel
to trigger a change of the double-fetched value between the two
fetches (𝒫2). This is not possible with previous techniques [39, 70].
As the first automated technique, we present DECAF, a double-
fetch-exposing cache-guided augmentation for fuzzers, leveraging
𝒫1 and𝒫2 in parallel to regular fuzzing. This allows us to automati-
cally detect double fetches in the kernel and to automatically narrow
them down to the exploitable double-fetch bugs (cf. Section 5), as
opposed to previous techniques [39, 70] which incurred several days
of manual analysis work by an expert to distinguish double-fetch
bugs from double fetches. Similar to previous approaches [39, 70],
which inherently could not detect all double-fetch bugs in the ana-
lyzed code base, our approach is also probabilistic and might not
detect all double-fetch bugs. However, due to their different under-
lying techniques, the previous approaches and ours complement
each other.
In Section 6, we present a novel method to simplify the elimi-
nation of detected double-fetch bugs (𝒫3). We observe previously
unknown interactions between double-fetch bugs and hardware
transactional memory. Utilizing these effects,𝒫3 can protect code
without requiring to identify the actual cause of a double-fetch bug.
Moreover, 𝒫3 can even be applied as a preventative measure to
protect critical code.
As a practical implementation of 𝒫3, we built DropIt, an open-
source 1 instantiation of𝒫3 based on Intel TSX. We implemented
DropIt as a library, which eliminates double-fetch bugs with as
few as 3 additional lines of code. We show that DropIt has the
same effect as rewriting the code to eliminate the double fetch.
1The source can be found in an anonymous GitHub repository
https://www.github.com/libdropit/libdropit.
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Figure 4: Flush+Reload timing trace for a syscall with a dou-
ble fetch. The two downward peaks show when the kernel
accessed the argument.
Furthermore, DropIt can automatically and transparently eliminate
double-fetch bugs in trusted execution environments such as Intel
SGX, in both desktop and cloud environments.
4 DETECTING DOUBLE FETCHES
We propose a novel dynamic approach to detect double fetches
based on their cache access pattern (𝒫1, cf. Section 3). The main
idea is to monitor the cache access pattern of syscall arguments
of a certain type, i.e., pointers or structures containing pointers.
These pointers may be accessed multiple times by the kernel and,
hence, a second thread can change the content. Other arguments
that are statically copied or passed by value, and consequently are
not accessed multiple times, cannot lead to double fetches.
To monitor access to potentially vulnerable function arguments,
we mount a Flush+Reload attack on each argument in dedicated
monitoring threads. A monitoring thread continuously flushes and
reloads the memory location referenced by the function argument.
As soon as the kernel accesses the function argument, the data is
loaded into the cache. In this case, the Flush+Reload attack in the
corresponding monitoring thread reports a cache hit.
Figure 4 shows a trace generated by a monitoring thread. The
trace contains the access time in cycles for the memory location
referenced by the function argument. If the memory is accessed
twice, i.e., a double fetch, we can see a second cache hit, as shown
in Figure 4. This provides us with primitive𝒫1.
4.1 Classification of Multiple Cache Hits
Multiple cache hits within one trace usually correspond to multiple
fetches. However, there are rare cases where this is not the case.
To entirely eliminate spurious cache hits from prefetching, we
simply disabled the prefetcher in software through MSR 0x1A4 and
allocated memory on different pages to avoid spatial prefetching.
Note that this does not have any effect on the overall system stability
and only a small performance impact. We want to discuss two other
factors influencing the cache access pattern in more detail.
Size of data type. Depending on the size of the data type, there are
differences in the cache access pattern. If the data fills exactly one
cache line, accesses to the cache line are clearly seen in the cache
access pattern. There are no false positives due to unrelated data in
the same cache set, and every access to the referenced memory is
visible in the cache access pattern.
To avoid false positives if the data size is smaller than a cache line
(i.e., 64 B), we allocate memory chunks with a multiple of the page
size, ensuring that dynamically allocated memory never shares
one cache line. Hence, accesses to unrelated data (i.e., separate
allocations) do not introduce any false positives, as they are never
stored in the same cache line. Thus, false positives are only detected
if the cache line contains either multiple parameters, local variables
or other members of the same structure.
Parameter reuse. With call-by-reference, one parameter of a func-
tion can be used both as input and output, e.g., in functions working
in-place on a given buffer. Using Flush+Reload, we cannot distin-
guish whether a cache hit is due to a read of or write to the memory.
Thus, we can only observe multiple cache hits without knowing
whether they are both caused by a memory read access or by other
activity on the same cache line.
4.2 Probability of Detecting a Double Fetch
The actual detection rate of a double fetch depends on the time
between two accesses. Each Flush+Reload cycle consists of flushing
the memory from the cache and measuring the access time to this
memory location afterwards. Such a cycle takes on average 298
cycles on an Intel i7-6700K. Thus, to detect a double fetch, the time
between the two memory accesses has to be at least two Flush+
Reload cycles, i.e., 596 CPU cycles.
We obtain the exact same results when testing a double fetch in
kernel space as in user space. Also, due to the high noise-resistance
of Flush+Reload (cf. Section 2), interrupts, context switches, and
other system activity have an entirely negligible effect on the result.
With the minimum distance of 596 CPU cycles, we can already de-
tect double fetches if the scheduling is optimal for both applications.
The further the memory fetches are apart, the higher the proba-
bility of detecting the double fetch. The probability of detecting
double fetches increases monotonically with the time between the
fetches, making it quite immune to interrupts such as scheduling.
If the double fetches are at least 3000 CPU cycles apart, we almost
always detect such a double fetch. In the real-world double-fetch
bugs we examined, the double fetches were always significantly
more than 3000 CPU cycles apart. Figure 11 (Appendix A) shows
the relation between the detection probability and the time between
the memory accesses, empirically determined on an Intel i7-6700K.
On a Raspberry Pi 3 with an ARMv8 1.2 GHz Broadcom BCM2837
CPU, a Flush+Reload cycle takes 250 cycles on average. Hence, the
double fetches must be at least 500 cycles apart to be detectable
with a high probability.
4.3 Automatically Finding Affected Syscalls
Using our primitive 𝒫1, we can already automatically and reli-
ably detect whether a double fetch occurs for a particular function
parameter. This is the first building block of DECAF. DECAF is
a two-phase process, consisting of a profiling phase which finds
double fetches and an exploitation phase narrowing down the set
of double fetches to only double-fetch bugs. We will now discuss
how DECAF augments existing fuzzers to discover double fetches
within operating system kernels fully automatically.
To test a wide range of syscalls and their parameters, we instan-
tiate DECAF with existing syscall fuzzers. For Linux, we retrofitted
the well-known syscall fuzzer Trinity with our primitive𝒫1. For
Windows, we extended the basic NtCall64 fuzzer to support semi-
intelligent parameter selection similar to Trinity. Subsequently, we
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retrofitted our extended NtCall64 fuzzer with our primitive𝒫1 as
well. Thereby, we demonstrate that DECAF is a generic technique
and does not depend on a specific fuzzer or operating system.
Our augmented and extended NtCall64 fuzzer, NtCall64DECAF
works for double fetches and double-fetch bugs in proof-of-concept
drivers. However, due to the severely limited coverage of the Nt-
Call64 fuzzer, we did not include it in our evaluations. Instead, we
focus on Linux only and leave retrofitting a good Windows syscall
fuzzer with DECAF for future work.
In the profiling phase of DECAF, the augmented syscall fuzzer
chooses a random syscall to test. The semi-intelligent parameter
selection of the syscall fuzzer ensures that the syscall parameters
are valid parameters in most cases. Hence, the syscall is executed
and does not abort in the initial sanity checks.
Every syscall parameter that is either a pointer, a file or directory
name, or an allocated buffer, can be monitored for double fetches.
As Trinity already knows the data types of all syscall parameters,
we can easily extend the main fuzzing routine. After Trinity selects
a syscall to fuzz, it chooses the arguments to test with and starts
a new process. Within this process, we spawn a Flush+Reload
monitoring thread for every parameter that may potentially contain
a double-fetch bug. The monitoring threads continuously flush the
corresponding syscall parameter and measure the reload time. As
soon as the parameter is accessed from kernel code, the monitoring
thread measures a low access time. The threads report the number
of detected accesses to the referenced memory after the syscall has
been executed. These findings are logged, and simultaneously, all
syscalls with double fetches are added to a candidate set for the
interleaved exploitation phase. In Section 5, we additionally show
how the second building block 𝒫2, allows to automatically test
whether such a double fetch is exploitable. Figure 10 (Appendix A)
shows the process structure of our augmented version of Trinity,
called TrinityDECAF.
4.4 Double-Fetch Detection for Black Boxes
The Flush+Reload-based detection method (𝒫1) is not limited to
double fetches in operating system kernels. In general, we can apply
the technique for all black boxes fulfilling the following criteria:
(1) Memory references can be passed to the black box.
(2) The referenced memory is (temporarily) shared between the
black box and the host.
(3) It is possible to run code in parallel to the execution of the
black box.
This generalization does not only apply to syscalls, but it also
applies to trusted execution environments.
Trusted execution environments are particularly interesting tar-
gets for double fetch detection and double-fetch-bug exploitation.
Trusted execution environments isolate programs from other user
programs and the operating system kernel. These programs are
often neither open source nor is the unencrypted binary available
to the user. Thus, if the vendor did not test for double-fetch bugs,
researchers not affiliated with the vendor have no possibility to
scan for these vulnerabilities. Moreover, even the vendor might not
be able to apply traditional double-fetch detection techniques, such
as dynamic program analysis, if these tools are not available within
the trusted execution environment.
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Figure 5: The probability of successfully exploiting a double-
fetch bug depending on the time between the accesses.
Both Intel SGX [48] and ARM TrustZone [1] commonly share
memory buffers between the host application and the trustlet run-
ning inside the trusted execution environment through their inter-
faces. Therefore, we can again utilize a Flush+Reload monitoring
thread to detect double fetches by the trusted application (𝒫1).
5 EXPLOITING DOUBLE-FETCH BUGS
In this section, we detail the second building block of DECAF,
primitive𝒫2, the base of the DECAF exploitation phase. It allows
us to exploit any double fetch found via𝒫1 (cf. Section 4) reliably
and automatically. In contrast to state-of-the-art value flipping [39]
(success probability 50 % or significantly lower), our exploitation
phase has a success probability of 97 %. The success probability of
value flipping is almost zero if multiple sanity checks are performed,
whereas the success probability of𝒫2 decreases only slightly.
5.1 Flush+Reload as a Trigger Signal
We propose to use Flush+Reload as a trigger signal to deterministi-
cally and reliably exploit double-fetch bugs. Indeed, Flush+Reload
is a reliable approach to detect access to the memory, allowing us
to flip the value immediately after an access. This combination of a
trigger signal and targeted value flipping forms primitive𝒫2.
The idea of the double-fetch-bug exploitation (𝒫2) is therefore
similar to the double-fetch detection (𝒫1). As soon as one access to
a parameter is detected, the value of the parameter is flipped to an
invalid value. Just as the double-fetch detection (cf. Section 4), we
can use a double-fetch trigger signal for every black box which uses
memory references as parameters in the communication interface.
As shown in Figure 5, the exploitation phase can target double-
fetch bugs with an even lower time delta between the accesses, than
the double-fetch detection in the profiling phase (cf. Section 4). The
reason is that only the first access has to be detected and chang-
ing the value is significantly faster than a full Flush+Reload cycle.
Thus, it is even possible to exploit double fetches where the time
between them is already too short to detect them. Consequently,
every double fetch detected in the profiling phase can clearly be
tested for exploitability using𝒫2 in the exploitation phase.
As a fast alternative to Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush [29] could
be used. Flush+Flush is significantly faster than Flush+Reload, but
also noisier. Our experiments confirmed that Flush+Reload is the
better choice for reliable double-fetch-bug exploitation.
5.2 Automated Syscall Exploitation
With the primitive𝒫2 from Section 5.1, we add the second build-
ing block to DECAF, to not only detect double fetches but also to
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immediately exploit them. This has the advantage that exploitable
double-fetch bugs can be found without human interaction, as the
automated exploitation leads to evident errors and system crashes.
As described in Section 4, DECAF does not only report the double
fetches but also adds them to a candidate set for double-fetch bug
testing. If a candidate is added to this set, the double-fetch bug test
(𝒫2) is immediately interleaved into the regular fuzzing process.
We randomly switch between four different methods to change
the value: setting it to zero, flipping the least significant bit, incre-
menting the value, and replacing it by a random value. Setting a
value to zero or a random value is useful to change pointers to
invalid locations. Furthermore, it is also effective on string buffers
as it can shorten the string, extend the string, or introduce invalid
characters. Incrementing a value or flipping the least significant bit
is especially useful if the referenced memory contains integers, as
it might trigger off-by-one errors.
In summary, in the exploitation phase of DECAF, we reduce the
double-fetch candidate set (obtained via𝒫1) to exploitable double-
fetch bugs without any human interaction (𝒫2), complementing
state-of-the-art techniques [39, 70]. The coverage of DECAF highly
depends on the fuzzer used. Fuzzing is probabilistic and might not
find every exploitable double fetch, but with growing coverage of
fuzzers, the coverage of DECAF will automatically grow as well.
6 ELIMINATING DOUBLE-FETCH BUGS
In this section, we propose the first transparent and automated
technique to entirely eliminate double-fetch bugs (𝒫3). We utilize
previously unknown interactions between double-fetch bugs and
hardware transactional memory.𝒫3 protects code without requir-
ing to identify the actual cause of a double-fetch bug and can even
be applied as a preventative measure to protect critical code.
We present the DropIt library, an instantiation of𝒫3 with Intel
TSX. DropIt eliminates double-fetch bugs, having the same effect
as rewriting the code to eliminate the double fetch. We also show
its application to Intel SGX, a trusted execution environment that
is particularly interesting in cloud scenarios.
6.1 Problems of State-of-the-Art Double-Fetch
Elimination
Introducing double-fetch bugs in software happens easily, and they
often stay undetected for many years. As shown recently, modern
operating systems still contain a vast number of double fetches,
some of which are exploitable double-fetch bugs [39, 70]. As shown
in Section 4 and Section 5, identifying double-fetch bugs requires
full code coverage, and before our work, a manual inspection of the
detected double fetches. Evenwhen double-fetch bugs are identified,
they are usually not trivial to fix.
A simple example of a double-fetch bug is a syscall with a string
argument of arbitrary length. The kernel requires two accesses to
copy the string, first to retrieve the length of the string and allocate
enough memory, and second, to copy the string to the kernel.
Writing this in a naïve way can lead to severe problems, such as
unterminated strings of kernel buffer overflows. One approach is to
use a retry logic, as shown in Algorithm 1 (Appendix B), as it used
in the Linux kernel whenever user data of unknown length has to
be copied to the kernel. Such methods increase the complexity and
runtime of code, and they are hard to wrap into generic functions.
Finally, compilers can also introduce double fetches that are
neither visible in the source code nor easily detectable, as they are
usually within just a few cycles [5].
6.2 Generic Double-Fetch Bug Elimination
Eliminating double-fetch bugs is not equivalent to eliminating dou-
ble fetches. Double fetches are valid constructs, as long as a change
of the value is successfully detected, or it is not possible to change
the value between two memory accesses. Thus, making a series of
multiple fetches atomic is sufficient to eliminate double-fetch bugs,
as there is only one operation from an attacker’s view (see Sec-
tion 2.4). Curiously, the concept of hardware transactional memory
provides exactly this atomicity.
As also described in Section 2.4, transactional memory provides
atomicity, consistency, and isolation [34]. Hence, by wrapping code
possibly containing a double fetch within a hardware transaction,
we can benefit from these properties. From the view of a different
thread, the code is one atomic memory operation. If an attacker
changes the referenced memory while the transaction is active, the
transaction aborts and can be retried. As the retry logic is imple-
mented in hardware and not simulated by software, the induced
overhead is minimal, and the amount of code is drastically reduced.
In a nutshell, hardware transactional memory can be instru-
mented as a hardware implementation of software-based retry
solutions discussed in Section 6.1. Thus, wrapping a double-fetch
bug in a hardware transaction does not hide, but actually eliminates
the bug (𝒫3). Similar to the software-based solution, our generic
double-fetch bug elimination can be automatically applied in many
scenarios, such as the interface between trust domains (e.g., ECALL
in SGX). Naturally, solving a problem with hardware support is
more efficient, and less error-prone, than a pure software solution.
In contrast to software-based retry solutions, our hardware-
assisted solution (𝒫3) does not require any identification of the
resource to be protected. For this reason, we can even prevent unde-
tectable or yet undetected double-fetch bugs, regardless of whether
they are introduced on the source level or by the compiler. As these
interfaces are clearly defined, the double-fetch bug elimination can
be applied in a transparent and fully automated manner.
6.3 Implementation of DropIt
To build DropIt, our instantiation of 𝒫3, we had to rely on real-
world hardware transactional memory, namely Intel TSX. Intel
TSX comes with a series of imperfections, inevitably introducing
practical limitations for security mechanisms, as observed in previ-
ous work [30] (cf. Section 2.4). However, as hardware transactional
memory is exactly purposed to make multiple fetches frommemory
consistent, Intel TSX is sufficient for most real-world scenarios.
To eliminate double-fetch bugs, DropIt relies on the XBEGIN
and XEND instructions of Intel TSX. XBEGIN specifies the start of
a transaction as well as a fall-back path that is executed if the
transaction aborts, whereas XEND marks the successful completion
of a transaction.
We find that on a typical Ubuntu Linux the kernel usually occu-
pies less than 32MB including all code, data, and heap used by the
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kernel and kernel modules. With an 8MB L3 cache we could thus
read or execute more than 20 % of the kernel without causing high
abort rates [30] (cf. Section 2.4). In Section 7.4, we show that for
practical use cases the abort rates are almost 0 % and our approach
even improves the system call performance in several cases.
DropIt abstracts the transactional memory as well as the retry
logic from the programmer. Hence, in contrast to existing software-
based retry logic (cf. Section 6.1), e.g., in the Linux kernel, DropIt
is mostly transparent to the programmer. To protect code, DropIt
takes the number of automatic retries as a parameter as well as a fall-
back function for the case that the transaction is never successful,
i.e., for the case of an ongoing attack. Hence, a programmer only
has to add 3 lines of code to protect arbitrary code from double
fetch exploitation. Listing 2 (Appendix E) shows an example how
to protect the insecure strcpy function using DropIt. The solution
with DropIt is clearly simpler than current state-of-the-art software-
based retry logic (cf. Algorithm 1). Finally, replacing software-based
retry logic by our hardware-assisted DropIt library can also improve
the execution time of protected syscalls.
DropIt is implemented in standard C and does not have any
dependencies. It can be used in user space, kernel space, and in
trusted environments such as Intel SGX enclaves. If TSX is not
available, DropIt immediately executes the fall-back function. This
ensures that syscalls still work on older systems, while modern
systems additionally benefit from possibly increased performance
and elimination of yet unknown double-fetch bugs.
DropIt can be used for any code containing multiple fetches,
regardless of whether they have been introduced on a source-code
level or by the compiler. In case there is a particularly critical section
in which a double fetch can cause harm, we can automatically
protect it using DropIt. For example, this is possible for parts of
syscalls that interact with the user space. As these parts are known
to a compiler, a compiler can simply add the DropIt functions there.
DropIt is able to eliminate double-fetch bugs in most real-world
scenarios. As Intel TSX is not an ideal implementation of hardware
transactional memory, use of certain instructions in transactions
is restricted, such as port I/O instructions [35]. However, double
fetches are typically caused by string handling functions and do
not rely on any restricted instructions. Especially in a trusted en-
vironment, such as Intel SGX enclaves, where I/O operations are
not supported, all functions interacting with the host application
can be automatically protected using DropIt. This is a particularly
useful protection against an attacker in a cloud scenario, where an
enclave containing an unknown double-fetch bug may be exposed
to an attacker over an extended period of time.
7 EVALUATION
The evaluation consists of four parts. The first part evaluates DECAF
(𝒫1 and 𝒫2), the second part compares 𝒫2 to state-of-the-art
exploitation techniques, the third part evaluates 𝒫1 on trusted
execution environments, and the fourth part evaluates DropIt (𝒫3).
First, we demonstrate the proposed detection method using
Flush+Reload. We evaluate the double-fetch detection of TrinityDE-
CAF on both a recent Linux kernel 4.10 and an older Linux kernel
4.6 on Ubuntu 16.10 and discuss the results. We also evaluate the
reliability of using Flush+Reload as a trigger in TrinityDECAF to
exploit double-fetch bugs (𝒫2). On Linux 4.6, we show that Trinity-
DECAF successfully finds and exploits CVE-2016-6516, a real-world
double-fetch bug.
Second, we compare our double-fetch bug exploitation technique
(𝒫2) to state-of-the-art exploitation techniques. We show that 𝒫2
outperforms value-flipping as well as a highly optimized exploit
crafted explicitly for one double-fetch bug. This underlines that𝒫2
is both generic and extends the state of the art significantly.
Third, we evaluate the double-fetch detection (𝒫1) on trusted
execution environments, i.e., Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone. We
show that despite the isolation of those environments, we can still
use our techniques to detect double fetches.
Fourth, we demonstrate the effectiveness of DropIt, our double-
fetch bug elimination method (𝒫3). We show that DropIt eliminates
source-code-level double-fetch bugs with a very low overhead. Fur-
thermore, we reproduce CVE-2015-8550, a compiler-introduced
double-fetch bug. Based on this example we demonstrate that
DropIt also eliminates double-fetch bugs which are not even visible
in the source code. Finally, we measure the performance of DropIt
protecting 26 syscalls in the Linux kernel, where TrinityDECAF
reported double fetches.
7.1 Evaluation of DECAF
To evaluate DECAF, we analyze the double fetches and double-fetch
bugs reported by TrinityDECAF. Our goal here is not to fuzz an ex-
cessive amount of time, but to demonstrate that DECAF constitutes
a sensible and practical complement to existing techniques. Hence,
we also used old and stable kernels where we did not expect to find
new bugs, but validate our approach.
Reported Double-Fetch Bugs. Besides many double fetches Trini-
tyDECAF reports in Linux kernel 4.6, it identifies one double-fetch
bug which is already documented as CVE-2016-6516. It is a double-
fetch bug in one of the ioctl calls. The syscall is used to share
physical sections of two files if the content is identical.
When calling the syscall, the user provides a file descriptor for
the source file as well as a starting offset and length within the
source file. Furthermore, the syscall takes an arbitrary number of
destination file descriptors with corresponding offsets and lengths.
The kernel checks whether the given destination sections are iden-
tical to the source section and if this is the case, frees the sections
and maps the source section into the destination file.
As the function allows for an arbitrary number of destination
files, the user has to supply the number of provided destination files.
This number is used to determine the amount of memory required
to allocate. Listing 1 (Appendix C) shows the corresponding code
from the Linux kernel. Changing the number between the allocation
and the actual access to the data structure leads to a kernel heap-
buffer overflow. Such an overflow can lead to a crash of the kernel
or even worse to a privilege escalation.
Trinity already has rudimentary support for the ioctl syscall,
which we extended with semi-intelligent defaults for parameter
selection. Consequently, while Trinity does not find CVE-2016-6516,
TrinityDECAF indeed successfully detects this double fetch in the
profiling phase. Figure 6 shows a cache trace while calling the
vulnerable function on Ubuntu 16.04 running an affected kernel 4.6.
Although the time between the two accesses is only 10 000 cycles
8
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
·105
100
200
300
Runtime [cycles]
A
cc
es
s
tim
e
[c
yc
le
s]
Figure 6: A real-world double-fetch bug that was present in
the Linux kernel fromversion 4.5 to 4.7. The twomemory ac-
cesses of the vulnerable function in the FIDEDUPERANGE ioctl
can be clearly seen at around 1.5 · 105 and 1.6 · 105 cycles.
(approximately 2.5 µs on our i7-6700K test machine), we can clearly
detect the two memory accesses.
When, in the exploitation phase, the monitoring thread changes
the value to a higher value (cf. Section 5.2) exceeding the actual num-
ber of provided file descriptors, the kernel iterates out-of-bounds,
as the number of file descriptors does not match the actual number
of file descriptors anymore. This out-of-bounds access to the heap
buffer results in a denial-of-service of the kernel and thus a hard
reboot is required. Consequently, the denial-of-service shows that
the double fetch is an exploitable double-fetch bug.
This demonstrates that DECAF is a useful complement to state-
of-the-art fuzzing techniques, allowing to automatically detect bugs
that cannot be found with traditional fuzzing approaches.
Reported Double Fetches. Besides Linux kernel 4.6, we also tested
TrinityDECAF on a recent Linux kernel 4.10. We let TrinityDECAF
investigate all 64-bit syscalls (currently 295) without exceptions
for one hour on an Intel i7-6700K. On average, every syscall was
executed 8058 times. Due to the semi-intelligent parameter selection
of TrinityDECAF, most syscalls are called with valid parameters. In
our test run, 75.12 % of the syscalls executed successfully. Hence,
on average, every syscall was successfully executed 6053 times,
indicating a high code coverage for every syscall.
For every syscall parameter, TrinityDECAF displays a percentage
of the calls where it detected a double fetch. Out of the 295 tested 64-
bit syscalls, TrinityDECAF reported double fetches for 68 syscalls in
Linux kernel 4.10. This is not surprising and in line with state-of-the-
art work [70] which reported 90 double fetches in Linux, but only
33 in syscalls. For each of the reported syscalls, we investigated the
respective implementation. Table 1 (Appendix A) shows a complete
list of reported syscalls and the reason why TrinityDECAF detected
a double fetch. We can group the reported syscalls into 5 major
categories, explaining the detected double fetch.
• Filenames.Most syscalls handling filenames (or paths) are re-
ported by TrinityDECAF. Many of them use getname_flags
internally to copy a filename to a kernel buffer. This function
checks whether the filename is already cached in the kernel, and
copies it to the kernel if this is not the case, resulting in multiple
accesses to the file name. The exploitation phase automatically
filtered out all non-exploitable double fetches in this category.
• Shared input/output parameters.We found 5 syscalls which
are reported by TrinityDECAF although they do not contain a
double fetch. In these syscalls, one of the syscall parameters was
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Figure 7: Comparing three exploits for the double-fetch bug
CVE-2016-6516. Our Flush+Reload-based trigger in Trinity-
DECAF succeeds in 97 % of the cases, outperforming the
provided proof-of-concept (84 %) and the state-of-the-art
method of value flipping (25 %).
used as input and output. As reads and writes are not distin-
guishable through the cache access pattern (cf. Section 4.1), these
syscalls are filtered out automatically in the exploitation phase.
• Strings of arbitrary length. As with filenames, some syscalls
expect strings from the user that do not have a fixed length.
To safely copy such arbitrary length strings, some syscalls (e.g.,
mount) use an algorithm similar to Algorithm 1. Thus, the de-
tected double fetch is due to the length check and the subsequent
string copy. The exploitation phase automatically filtered out all
non-exploitable double fetches in this category.
• Sanity check.Many syscalls check—either directly, or in a sub-
routine—whether the supplied argument is sane. There are sanity
checks that check whether it is safe to access a user-space pointer
before actually copying data from or to it. Such a check can also
trigger a cache hit if the value was actually accessed. All correct
sanity checks were automatically filtered out in the exploita-
tion phase. The exploitation phase correctly identified the ioctl
syscall in the Linux kernel 4.6, but also correctly filtered it out in
Linux kernel 4.10.
• Structure elements. If a syscall has a structure as parameter,
double fetches can be falsely detected if structure members fall
into the same cache line (cf. Section 4.1). If members are either
copied element-wise or neighboring members are simply ac-
cessed, TrinityDECAF will detect a double fetch although two
different variables are accessed. Again, these false positives are
filtered out in the exploitation phase.
Our evaluation showed that TrinityDECAF provides a sensible
complement to existing double-fetch bug detection techniques. The
fact that we found only 1 exploitable double-fetch bug in 68 dou-
ble fetches is not surprising, and in line with previous work, e.g.,
Wang et al. [70] found 3 exploitable double-fetch bugs by manually
inspecting 90 double fetches they found. However, it also shows
that the coverage of DECAF highly depends on the fuzzer used
to instantiate it. Future work may retrofit other fuzzers with DE-
CAF, to extend the spectrum of bugs that the fuzzer covers and
thereby also extend the coverage of DECAF. Furthermore, as Trin-
ity is continuously extended, the coverage of TrinityDECAF grows
automatically with the coverage of Trinity.
7.2 Evaluation of 𝒫2
To evaluate 𝒫2 in detail, we compare three different variants to
exploit the double-fetch bug reported in CVE-2016-6516. First, the
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Figure 8:The probability to exploit a double-fetch bug if a cer-
tain number of fetches are used for sanity check. The more
sanity checks, the lower the probability to change the value
only between the second to last and last access.
provided exploit, which calls ioctlmultiple times, always changing
the affected variable after a slightly increased delay. Second, we
use state-of-the-art value flipping to switch the affected variable as
fast as possible between the valid and an invalid value. Third, the
automated approach𝒫2, integrated into TrinityDECAF.
Figure 7 shows the success rate of 1000 executions of each of
the three variants. Value flipping has by far the worst success rate,
although in theory, it should have a success rate of approximately
50 %. In half of the cases, the value is flipped before the first access.
Thus, the exploit fails, as the value is smaller at the next access. In
the other cases, the probability to switch the value at the correct
time is again 50 % resulting in an overall success rate of 25 %.
The original exploit is highly optimized for this specific vulnera-
bility. It uses a trial-and-error busy wait with steadily increasing
timeouts, which works surprisingly well, as there is sufficient time
between the two accesses. Depending on the scheduling, the at-
tacker sometimes sleeps too long (4 %) and sometimes too short
(12 %). Still, the busy wait outperforms the value flipping in this
scenario, increasing the success probability from 25 % to 84 %.
Even though our Flush+Reload-based trigger (𝒫2) is generic and
does not require fine-tuning of the sleep intervals, it has the highest
success rate. There is no case where the value was changed too early,
as there are no false positives with Flush+Reload in this scenario.
Furthermore, as the time between the two memory accesses is long
enough, we achieve an almost perfect success rate of 97 %. The
remaining 3 %, where we do not trigger a change of the value, are
caused by unfortunate scheduling of the application.
The success rate of value flipping drops significantly if the two
values have to fulfill specific constraints, e.g., the value has to be
higher on the second access. For example, if an application does not
only fetch the value twice, but multiple times for sanity checking,
the probability of successfully exploiting it using value flipping
decreases exponentially.
Figure 8 shows the probability to exploit a double fetch similar
to CVE-2016-6516, with additional fetches for sanity checks. To
successfully exploit the vulnerability, the value has to be the same
for all sanity checks and must be higher for the last access. Flipping
the value between a valid and an invalid value decreases the chances
by 50 % for every additional sanity check.
Our Flush+Reload-based method (𝒫2) does not suffer signifi-
cantly from additional sanity checks. We can accurately trigger on
the second to last access to change the value. The slightly decreased
probability is only due to missed accesses.
7.3 Evaluation of 𝒫1 on Trusted Execution
Environments
We evaluate𝒫1 on trusted execution environments by successfully
detecting double fetches in Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone.
Intel SGX. Intel SGX allows running code in secure enclaves
without having to trust the user or the operating system. A program
running inside an enclave is not accessible to the operating system
due to hardware isolation provided by SGX. Weichbrodt et al. [73]
showed that synchronization bugs, such as double fetches, inside
SGX enclaves, can be exploited to hijack the control flow or bypass
access control.
As it has been shown recently, enclaves leak information through
the last-level cache, even to unprivileged user space applications,
as they share the last-level cache with regular user space appli-
cations [6, 28, 54, 64]. SGX enclaves provide a communication in-
terface using so-called ecalls and ocalls, similar to the syscall
interface. Enclaves fulfill the properties of Section 4.4, and we can
thus detect double fetches within enclaves, even without access to
the binary. Therefore, we can apply our method to identify double
fetches within SGX enclaves.
To test our Flush+Reload detection mechanism (𝒫1), we imple-
mented a small enclave application. This application consists of
only one ecall, which takes a memory reference as a parameter.
As enclaves can access non-enclave memory, the user can simply al-
locate memory and provide the pointer to the enclave. The enclave
accesses the memory once, idles a few thousand cycles and reac-
cesses the memory. Although the enclave should be isolated from
other applications, the monitoring application can clearly detect
the 2 cache hits. Figure 13 (Appendix D) shows the measurement
of the Flush+Reload thread running outside the enclave on an Intel
i5-6200U. Similarly, Appendix D evaluates𝒫1 on ARM TrustZone.
7.4 Evaluation of DropIt
To evaluate our open-source library DropIt, as an instantiation of
𝒫3, we investigate two real-world scenarios. In the first scenario,
we demonstrate how DropIt eliminates a compiler-introduced real-
world double-fetch bug in Xen (CVE-2015-8550). In the second sce-
nario, we evaluate the effect of DropIt on Linux syscalls with double
fetches. Our findings show that DropIt successfully eliminates all
double-fetch bugs and can be used as a preventative measure to
protect double fetches in syscalls generically.
Eliminating Compiler-Introduced Double-Fetch Bugs. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.3, compilers can also introduce double-fetch
bugs. Especially switch statements are prone to double-fetch bugs
if the variable is subject to a race condition [5, 53]. This is not an
issue with the compiler, as the compiler is allowed to assume an
atomic value for the switch condition [11]. We are aware of two
scenarios where code generated by gcc contains a double-fetch bug.
If a switch is translated into a jump table with a default case,
gcc generates two accesses to the switch variable. The first access
checks whether the parameter is within the bounds of the jump
table, the second access calculates the actual jump target. Thus, if
the parameter changes between the accesses, a malicious user can
divert the control flow of the program.
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Figure 9: IOZone Fileops benchmark showing the perfor-
mance of file operations. The number of executed opera-
tions per second of our re-implemented getname_flags us-
ing DropIt (green) does not significantly differ from the ver-
sion in the vanilla kernel (red).
If the switch is implemented as multiple conditional jumps, the
compiler is allowed to fetch the variable for every conditional jump.
This leads to cases where the switch executes the default case as
the variable changes while checking the conditions [53].
We evaluated DropIt on the real-world compiler-introduced
double-fetch bug CVE-2015-8550. This vulnerability in Xen allowed
arbitrary code execution due to a compiler-introduced double fetch
within a switch statement. Note that such a switch statement is a
common construct and can occur in any other kernel, e.g., Linux,
or Windows, if a memory buffer is shared between user space and
kernel space. Wrapping the switch statement using DropIt results
in a clean and straightforward fix without relying on the compiler.
With DropIt, any compiler-introduced switch-related double-fetch
bug is successfully eliminated using only 3 lines of additional code.
To compare the overhead of traditional locking and DropIt, we
implemented a minimal working example of a compiler-introduced
double-fetch bug. Our example consists of a switch statement that
has 5 different cases as well as a default case. The condition is a
pointer which is subject to a race condition. The average execution
time of the switch statement without any protection is 7.6 cycles.
Using a spinlock to protect the variable increased the average exe-
cution time to 83.7 cycles. DropIt achieved a higher performance
than the traditional spinlock with an average execution time of 68.0
cycles. Thus, with 3 additional lines of code, DropIt is not only easy
to deploy but also achieves a better performance than traditional
locking mechanisms.
Preventative Protection of Linux Syscalls. To show that DropIt pro-
vides an automated and transparent generic solution to eliminate
double-fetch bugs, we also used DropIt in the Linux kernel. As dis-
cussed in Section 7.1, a majority of the double fetches we detected
in the Linux kernel are due to the getname_flags function han-
dling file names. We replaced this function with a straight-forward
implementation protected by DropIt. With this small change, all
double fetches previously reported in 26 syscalls were covered by
DropIt, and thus all potential double-fetch bugs were eliminated.
To compare the performance of DropIt with the vanilla imple-
mentation, we executed 210 million file operations in both cases.
All benchmarks were run on a bare metal kernel to reduce the
impact of system noise. Figure 9 shows the result of the IOzone
filesystem benchmark [56]. On average, the benchmarks show a
0.8 % performance degradation on the tested file operations that
are affected by our kernel change. In some cases, DropIt even has a
better performance than the vanilla implementation. We therefore
conclude that DropIt has no perceptible performance impact. The
variances in the tests are probably due to the underlying hardware,
i.e., the SSDs on which we performed the file operations.
Thus, DropIt provides a reliable and straightforward way to
cope with double-fetch bugs. It is easily integrable into existing C
projects and does not negatively influence the performance com-
pared to state-of-the-art solutions. Furthermore, it even increases
the performance compared to traditional locking mechanisms.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed novel techniques to efficiently detect,
exploit, and eliminate double-fetch bugs. We presented the first
combination of state-of-the-art cache attacks with kernel-fuzzing
techniques. This allowed us to find double fetches in a fully auto-
mated way. Furthermore, we presented the first fully automated
reliable detection and exploitation of double-fetch bugs. By combin-
ing these two primitives, we built DECAF, a system to automatically
find and exploit double-fetch bugs. DECAF is the first method that
makes manual analysis of double fetches as in previous work su-
perfluous. We show that cache-based triggers, as we use in DECAF,
outperform state-of-the-art exploitation techniques significantly,
leading to an exploitation success rate of up to 97 %.
DECAF constitutes a sensible complement to existing double-
fetch detection techniques. Future work may retrofit more fuzzers
with DECAF, extending the spectrum of bugs covered by fuzzers.
Hence, double-fetch bugs do not require separate detection tools
anymore, but testing for these bugs can now be a part of regu-
lar fuzzing. With continuously growing coverage of fuzzers, the
covered search space for potential double-fetch bugs grows as well.
With DropIt, we leverage a newfound interaction between hard-
ware transactional memory and double fetches, to completely elim-
inate double-fetch bugs. Furthermore, we showed that DropIt can
be used in a fully automated manner to harden Intel SGX enclaves
such that double-fetch bugs cannot be exploited. Finally, our evalu-
ation of DropIt in the Linux kernel showed that it can be applied to
large systems with a negligible performance overhead below 1 %.
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A TRINITYDECAF AND DETECTED DOUBLE
FETCHES
In this section, we show implementation details of TrinityDECAF
(our augmented version of Trinity) as well as a complete list of
syscalls reported by TrinityDECAF.
Figure 10 shows the process structure of our augmented version
of Trinity, called TrinityDECAF. The syscall fuzzer Trinity is ex-
tended with one monitoring threads per syscall argument. Each
of the monitoring threads mounts a Flush+Reload attack to detect
double fetches (cf. Section 4.3).
Figure 11 shows the probability that TrinityDECAF detects a
double fetch depending on the time between the two accesses to
the memory (cf. Section 4.2)
Table 1 is a complete table of reported syscalls and the reason
why TrinityDECAF detected a double fetch. The categories are
discussed in detail in Section 7.1.
TrinityDECAF
trinity-main trinity-watchdog
do_syscall 1 do_syscall 2 do_syscall n
monitor 1 ... monitorm
Figure 10: The structure of TrinityDECAF with the Flush+
Reload monitoring threads for the syscall parameters.
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Figure 11: The probability of detecting a double fetch depend-
ing on the time between the accesses.
Table 1: Double fetches found by TrinityDECAF.
Category Syscall
Filenames open, newstat, truncate, chdir, rename(at),
mkdir(at), rmdir, creat, unlink, link, symlink(at),
readlink(at), chmod, (l)chown, utime, mknod,
statfs, chroot, quotactl, *xattr, fchmodat
Shared input/output sendfile, adjtimex, io_setup, recvmmsg, send-
mmsg
Strings mount, memfd_create
Sanity check sched_setparam, ioctl, sched_setaffinity,
io_cancel, sched_setscheduler, futimesat, sysctl,
settimeofday, gettimeofday
Structure elements recvmsg, msgsnd, sigaltstack, utime
B SAFE STRING COPY
In this section, we show the pseudo-code of a standard algorithm
used to safely copy an arbitrary-length string. Algorithm 1 first
retrieves the length of the string, to allocate a buffer and copy
the string up to this length. Then, it checks whether the string is
terminated, and if not, retries again as the buffer was apparently
changed before copying it.
A similar algorithm is used in the Linux kernel whenever user
data of unknown length has to be copied to the kernel.
Algorithm 1: Safe string copy for arbitrary string lengths with
software-based retry logic.
input : string
copy:
len← strlen(string);
buffer← allocate(len + 1);
strncpy(buffer, string, len);
if not isNullTerminated(buffer) then
free(buffer);
goto copy; // or abort with error if too many retries
end
C CVE-2016-6516
CVE-2016-6516 is a double-fetch bug in an ioctl call used to share
physical sections of two files if the content is identical. This dedu-
plicates the identical section to save physical storage. On a write
access, the identical section has to be copied to ensure that the
changes are only visible within the changed file.
The user provides a file descriptor for the source file as well as a
starting offset and length within the source file. Additionally, the
syscall takes an arbitrary number of destination file descriptors
including offsets and lengths. The kernel maps the source section
into the destination file if the given destination sections are identical
to the source section.
The function supports an arbitrary number of destination files.
Thus, the user has to supply the number of provided destination
files, so that the kernel can determine the required amount of mem-
ory to allocate. Listing 1 shows the corresponding code from the
Linux kernel. If the number changes between the allocation and the
actual access to the data structure, the kernel accesses the buffer
out-of-bounds, leading to a heap-buffer overflow.
1 // first access of dest_count
2 if (get_user(count, &argp->dest_count)) { [...] }
3 // allocation based on dest_count
4 size = offsetof(struct file_dedupe_range __user ,
5 info[count]);
6 same = memdup_user(argp , size);
7 if (IS_ERR(same)) { [...] }
8 ret = vfs_dedupe_file_range(file , same);
9 // function accesses same->dest_count, not count
Listing 1: The vulnerable ioctl_file_ dedupe_range function
that was present in the Linux kernel from version 4.5 to 4.7.
The dest_count member is accessed twice and can thus be
changed between the accesses by a malicious user, leading
to a kernel heap-buffer overflow.
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Figure 12:Adouble fetch of a trustlet running inside theARM
TrustZone of a Raspberry Pi 3. The cache hits can be clearly
seen at around 0.96 ·106 and 3.01 ·106 cycles as the access time
drops from >160 cycles to <120 cycles.
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Figure 13: Monitoring a double fetch inside an SGX enclave.
The cache hits can be clearly seen at around 0.75 · 106 and
1.21 · 106 cycles as the access time drops from >150 cycles to
<140 cycles.
ARM TrustZone is a trusted execution environment for the ARM
platform. The processor can either run in the normal world or the
trusted world. As with Intel SGX, the worlds are isolated from
each other using hardware mechanisms. Trustlets—applications
running inside the secure world—provide a well-defined interface
to normal world applications. This interface is accessed through a
secure monitor call, similar to a syscall.
To use the ARM TrustZone, the normal-world operating system
requires TrustZone support. Furthermore, a secure-world operating
system has to run inside the TrustZone. For the evaluation, we used
the TrustZone of a Raspberry Pi 3. We use the open-source trusted
execution environment OP-TEE [44] as a secure-world operating
system. The normal world runs a TrustZone-enabled Linux kernel.
As with Intel SGX (cf. Section 7.3), we again implement a trustlet
providing a simple interface for receiving a pointer to a memory
location. However, there are some subtle differences compared to
the SGX enclave. First, trustlets are not allowed to simply access
normal-worldmemory. To pass data ormessages from normal world
to secure world and vice versa, world shared memory is used, a
region of non-secure memory, mapped both in the normal as well
as in the secure world. With the world shared memory, we fulfill
all criteria of Section 4.4.
On ARM, there are generally no unprivileged instructions to
flush the cache or get a high-resolution timestamp [2]. However,
they can be used from the operating system. Thus, in contrast to
the double-fetch detection in syscalls or Intel SGX, we require root
privileges to detect double fetches inside the TrustZone. This is
not a real limitation, as we use the detection only for testing, and
discovering bugs. An attacker using Flush+Reload as a trigger to
exploit a double-fetch bug can rely on different time sources and
eviction strategies as proposed by Lipp et al. [45].
Figure 12 shows a recorded cache trace of the trustlet. Similarly
to Figure 13, a trace from Intel SGX, the cache hits are clearly distin-
guishable from the cache misses. Thus, we can detect double-fetch
bugs in trustlets, even without having access to the corresponding
binaries.
E EXAMPLE OF DROPIT
In this section, we show a small example of how to use DropIt.
Listing 2 shows an example how to protect the insecure strcpy
function using DropIt. A programmer only has to add 3 lines of
code (highlighted in the listing) to protect arbitrary code from
double fetch exploitation. DropIt is clearly simpler than current
state-of-the-art software-based retry logic (cf. Algorithm 1).
DropIt is implemented in standard C without any dependencies
on other libraries, and can thus be used in user space, kernel space,
as well as in trusted execution environments (e.g., Intel SGX). If
Intel TSX is not available, DropIt has the possibility to execute a
fall-back function instead.
1 dropit_t config = dropit_init(1000);
2 dropit_start(config);
3 len = strlen(str); // First access
4 if (len < sizeof(buffer)) {
5 strcpy(buffer , str); // 2nd access ,
6 // length of 'str' could have changed
7 } else {
8 printf("Too long!\n");
9 }
10 dropit_end(config, { printf("Fail!"); exit(-1);});
Listing 2: Using DropIt to protect a simple string copy
containing a double-fetch bug from being exploited. Only
the highlighted lines (1, 2, and 10) have to be added to the
existing code to eliminate the double-fetch bug.
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